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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the State introduced sufficient evidence at 
trial to support the jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of 
committing a second degree felony theft in Utah. 
2. Whether the defendant can raise the issue of the 
propriety of Jury Instruction 14 for the first time on appeal. 
3. Whether Jury Instruction 14 regarding possession of 
recently stolen property was constitutionally defective. 
ill 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES EDWARD MASSEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870385-CA 
(Pr ior i ty No. 2 ) 
Brief of Respondent 
Statement of the Case 
The defendant was charged with Burglary of a Dwelling, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-
6-202 (1953, as amended), and with Theft of Property exceeding 
$1000 in value, also a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 (1953, as amended), both crimes 
alleged to have occurred on or about March 22-24, 1987, in West 
Point, County of Davis, State of Utah. In a jury trial held July 
15, 1987, with the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, 
presiding, the defendant was found not guilty of the burglary 
charge and guilty of the theft charge. 
At the conclusion of the State's evidence at trial, the 
defendant moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-1-201, claiming that the State had failed to present 
evidence that the theft had occurred within the State of Utah and 
that the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction. This motion 
was denied. Subsequent to the trial and prior to sentencing, the 
defendant moved the trial court to arrest judgment and to set 
aside the jury's verdict of guilty on the theft charge, again 
claiming a lack of jurisdiction under Section 76-1-201. These 
motions were denied on August 11, 1987, and on that date the 
defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of 1-15 years, to pay a fine of $5,000.00 plus 
a surcharge of $1,250.00, and to pay restitution to Lee Thompson 
in the amount of $28,180.00. 
Statement of the Facts 
In the early part of March, 1987, Norma Thompson 
underwent a serious knee surgery. Because the surgery was 
temporarily incapacitating, and because Norma's husband, Lee 
Thompson, was also in poor health, the two of them stayed with 
their daughter, Kathleen Massey (aka Kathy Huff) in her residence 
in Ogden. (T. 11, 24, 66-67) The defendant, Charles Massey, 
lived at the Ogden address with Kathleen, as her common-law 
husband. Also living at the Ogden residence were Shelly Powell, 
Kathleen's daughter, and John Dobson, a friend of the defendant. 
(T. 23, 63, 72, 81-82) 
While staying with Kathleen, the Thompsons had left 
their usual residence, a house at 3510 West 1300 North, in West 
Point, vacant. They were renting this house from Norma's son, 
Dennis Bingham. Most of the Thompsons' personal belongings and 
valuables remained at the house in West Point. Cheryl Lynn, 
another daughter of Norma, checked up on the West Point house 
regularly and picked up the mail daily. (T. 11, 18, 23) 
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On March 24, 1987, the defendant and his friend, John 
Dobson, left the Ogden residence sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 
p.m. to go get a part for a broken grinder. They never returned. 
(T. 63-64, 70-71) At approximately 4:00 p.m. the same day, 
Dennis Bingham went to the Thompsons' residence in West Point to 
feed a goat he kept in the back pasture, and discovered that the 
house had been broken into. (T. 11-12) More than $20,000.00 
worth of property had been removed. (T. 25-51, 61) 
Dennis Bingham called the police, and Davis County 
Sheriff's deputies processed the scene, finding two yellow-
handled screwdrivers in the house. One was found on the TV stand 
from which a VCR had been removed during the burglary, and the 
other was found on the floor of a back bedroom next to a filing 
cabinet that had been pried open. (T. 76-78, 101-103) Both were 
later identified by Shelly Powell as belonging to the defendant, 
by means of red paint markings on each, as Shelly had watched the 
defendant paint his car a red primer color sometime before the 
burglary. (T. 82-84) 
At trial, Shelly produced and identified, for the first 
time, two additional yellow-handled screwdrivers, also with red 
paint markings. (T. 85-86) She stated that all four 
screwdrivers had belonged to the defendant (T. 86), but that she 
now recalled that the defendant had given the two screwdrivers 
found at the scene of the burglary to a person called Sonny Terry 
prior to the burglary. (T. 86-87, 90) She stated that she had 
not remembered that fact when she first talked to the police, and 
had only been reminded of it about a month prior to trial when 
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she saw the two "new" screwdrivers in the trunk of the 
defendant's car. (T. 90-92) 
Carl Terry ("Sonny") testified that the defendant had 
never given him any screwdrivers, although he was aware that the 
defendant had put red primer paint on two separate cars, similar 
to the paint on the two screwdrivers. He also testified that he 
did not burglarize Lee Thompson's house. (T. 95-97) 
Based on the identification of the two screwdrivers 
found at the scene, and the simultaneous disappearance of the 
defendant and the property from the house, a warrant was issued 
for his arrest. Four days later, on March 28, 1987, the 
defendant was stopped for speeding near Bend, Oregon, by Oregon 
State Police Officer Ken Hodson. John Dobson was the sole 
passenger in the vehicle with the defendant. It was the same 
vehicle, a red and white Monte Carlo, registered to the 
defendant, in which the defendant and Dobson had left Utah a few 
days earlier. (T. 105-106, 150) Hodson arrested the defendant 
on the Utah warrant, and with the defendant's consent, searched 
the vehicle, seized some items, and impounded it. Two days 
later, after speaking with the Utah Sheriff's detective, Hodson 
again searched the vehicle with the defendant's consent, and 
discovered more items. (T. 108-118) 
Officer Hodson discovered the following items in the 
locations indicated: 
1. A Franklin Mint Mailer tube addressed to Lee 
Thompson, found in open view in the trunk of defendant's vehicle 
(T. 108-109), which had been locked in a black suitcase or 
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footlocker stolen from a basement shelf in Thompson's home. (T. 
42) 
2. A string necktie or bolo tie, found in the pocket of 
a blue down coat in the back seat of the Monte Carlo, (T. 110-
112) which had been taken from a white box on Lee Thompson's 
dresser. (T. 41) The defendant told Officer Hodson that the 
blue coat was his, and also claimed that he owned the string tie. 
(T. Ill, 125) 
3. A bead bracelet or necklace with earrings, found in 
the opposite pocket of the blue down coat (T. 112), which had 
been taken from the pried-open filing cabinet in the Thompson 
home. (T. 68-69) 
4. A baggie full of various old as well as current 
coins and tokens found in the defendant's pants pocket (T. 
118), which had been in a green footlocker in the Thompson's 
basement. (T. 44-48) 
5. A plastic Safeway shopping bag found concealed 
under the floor carpet of the trunk of the Monte Carlo in a 
fender well or wheel well (T. 116-118), which contained old 
watches (one of which had been Lee Thompson's grandfather's 
watch), a small pure silver token which had travelled around the 
noon in one of the Apollo flights, and which was itself worth 
more than $1,000.00; these items had been in the green and the 
black footlocker taken from the basement. (T. 50-51) 
6. A baggie full of guarters and an envelope with Lee 
Thompson's handwriting on it, also found in the wheel well; these 
items had also been stolen from the Thompson home. (T. 48-49, 
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119-120) 
Most of the items stolen from the Thompson home were 
never recovered (T. 60-61), although the defendant did have in 
excess of $900.00 in large bills on his person when arrested in 
Oregon, which money he had not had when he left Utah. (T. 126-
127, 152-153) 
Summary of The Argument 
1. There was an abundance of evidence supporting the 
jury verdict that the defendant committed the crime of theft in 
Utah. 
2. The defendant did not object to the giving of Jury 
Instruction No. 14, and cannot raise the issue for the first time 
on appeal. 
3. The Jury Instruction regarding possession of 




THE RECORD CONTAINS AMPLE EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHING THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY THEFT IN UTAH. 
It is undisputed that, in order for a Utah court to have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a criminal offense, the 
evidence must show that at least part of the crime occurred in 
Utah. The applicable Utah Code provision, Section 76-1-201 
provides, in pertinent part; 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in 
this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by 
his own conduct or that of another for which 
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he is legally accountable if: 
a) The offense is committed either wholly or 
partly within the state; 
* * * 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which is an 
element of the offense, or the result which 
is such an element, occurs within this 
state.•.. 
This Court has adopted the following standard of review 
when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 
The standard for determining sufficiency of 
the evidence is that the evidence be "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds could not reasonably believe 
defendant had committed a crime." State v. 
Romero. 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). In 
determining whether evidence is sufficient, 
the Court will review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (Utah 1980). Unless there is a clear 
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict 
will be upheld. State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 
811, 814 (Utah 1977). 
State v. Gabaldon. 735 P.2d 410 (Ct. App. April 15, 1987). As 
noted in State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." State 
V. Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); 
accord State v. Linden. Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 
1366 (1983). So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, 
our inquiry stops. 
Id. at 345 (citation omitted). And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be 
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upheld. State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). In short, 
"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the 
version of the facts which supports the verdict." State v. 
Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Howell. 
649 P.2d at 93). See also. State v. Moncada. No. 860243-CA (Ut. 
Ct. App. May 13, 1987). 
In reviewing the record of the evidence presented in the 
present case "in the light most favorable to the jury verdict," 
it becomes clear that there was ample evidence, both to support 
the jury finding that the defendant committed a second degree 
felony theft, and to support the finding that at least one, if 
not all of the elements of that theft occurred in Utah. 
It was never disputed that Lee and Norma Thompson had 
more than $20,000.00 worth of their personal property taken from 
their home in West Point. It was also not disputed that no one 
had permission to take that property, nor did the defendant, in 
his statement to Officer Hodson, ever claim to have had 
permission to take any of the property from the Thompsons. It 
was further not disputed that the defendant was caught in 
possession of more than $1,000.00 worth of that property on a 
freeway near Bend, Oregon, four days after he and the property 
had initially disappeared. Some of the property was in the 
defendant's pants pocket, some was in each of two pockets of his 
coat in the back seat of his car, some was in plain view in the 
trunk of his car, and some was hidden in the trunk of his car. 
The defendant claims, however, that "[T]here is 
absolutely no evidence to show that Mr. Massey committed a theft 
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in Utah and/or obtained or exercised unauthorized control over 
the stolen property while in Utah." (Appellant's Brief, p.4) 
Such an assertion simply ignores the evidence in the record. 
Each of the following points of evidence presented to the jury 
indicate that the defendant stole the property while in Utah: 
1. The fact that the two screwdrivers belonging to the 
defendant were left in the victim's home and had apparently been 
used in obtaining the property. It is true that Shelly Powell 
claimed that the defendant had given these two screwdrivers to 
"Sonny" Terry prior to the burglary. However, Sonny Terry 
testified that that was not true, and that the defendant had 
never given Sonny any screwdrivers. The jury was free to believe 
whom they chose and, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Booker above, an appellate court may not and cannot substitute 
its judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of one 
witness against another. 
2. The defendant apparently knew the location in the 
victim's home from which some of the stolen property was taken. 
When questioned by Officer Hodson about fingerprints, the 
defendant not only stated that his own fingerprints would be all 
over the house, but specifically mentioned that his fingerprints 
would be on "the file cabinet." (T. 125) Only someone who had 
been at the filing cabinet and taken property from it would have 
any reason to believe that the police would have cause to lift 
fingerprints from such a specific location. Not surprisingly, it 
was the filing cabinet from which several of the stolen items 
were taken, and it was the filing cabinet that had been pried 
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open with the defendant's screwdriver. 
3. The defendant and the stolen property disappeared 
simultaneously. Furthermore, the defendant's disappearance from 
Utah was not a scheduled trip, or anything he talked about or 
mentioned in advance. He and his friend Dobson simply drove 
away, supposedly to get a grinder fixed, and vanished. 
4. Both the defendant and the stolen property were 
found in Oregon in the same vehicle in which the defendant left 
Utah. The defendant owned that vehicle and was the driver. None 
of the stolen property was found on the person or among the 
belongings of Dobson, the sole passenger. 
5. The defendant was specifically asked by Officer 
Hodson as to how he had obtained possession of each of the groups 
of stolen items. The defendant's explanations did not include 
any claim that he acquired any of the items at any location 
outside the State of Utah. (T. 123-124) Nor can one imagine any 
reasonable scenario explaining how the defendant could have 
acquired any of the stolen items outside of Utah, during the four 
days he and Dobson were travelling up and down the west coast. 
6. While there was a considerable amount of ransacking 
done in the upstairs of the house, that was not the case with the 
shelf area in the basement from which the green and black 
footlockers were taken. The other boxes and suitcases on those 
shelves did not appear to have been disturbed, suggesting that 
whoever took the two footlockers knew what they were after. (T. 
76) The defendant knew that Lee Thompson was a coin collector, 
and had personally helped move the footlockers and the filing 
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cabinet in the past, and had personally placed two guns under the 
bed from which they were stolen. (T. 27-28, 52-53) 
7. There was testimony that it would probably have 
taken two people to move the one footlocker. (T. 59-60) Not 
surprisingly, when the defendant left the state, he happened to 
take a friend with him - the same friend who was still with him 
four days later with much of the stolen property in his 
possession. 
8. Finally, the defendant's financial situation was 
highly suspect. When he and Dobson left Utah, they had little 
money between them, and this was apparently all Dobson's money. 
(T. 152) When arrested four days later, however, the defendant 
miraculously had in excess of $900.00. Dobson testified as a 
defense witness that the defendant made $1,000.00 by acquiring, 
mixing, and selling "coke" as soon as they arrived in Spokane, 
Washington. (T. 152) The jury could possibly have believed that 
story, or they could have accepted a more rational explanation 
that was more consistent with the evidence - that the $900.00 was 
obtained from selling or pawning old coin collections, a VCR, 
guns, and other items at various locations. 
In short, the evidence supporting the jury verdict that 
the defendant exercized unauthorized control over property 
belonging to Lee and Norma Thompson valued at greater than 
$1,000.00, and that the defendant did so in Utah, is abundant. 
The defendant contends that the jury's finding of not 
guilty on the burglary count somehow undermines their finding of 
guilt on the theft charge having occurred in Utah. This is not 
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true. In order to prove the burglary charge, the State had to 
prove, among other things, that the defendant entered a dwelling 
unlawfully (Instruction 9, R. 37). The jury was further 
instructed that an entry is unlawful when the premises "are not 
open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed 
or privileged to enter or remain on the premise..." (Instruction 
10, R. 38) 
There was testimony in the present case that the 
defendant had at one time lived with the Thompsons in the house 
from which the property was taken (T. 28, 63), and that within a 
few days prior, had gone to that house with permission to pick up 
the mail, get firewood, etc. Furthermore, Lee Thompson testified 
that, while he had not given the defendant permission to enter 
the house on this occasion, he had not specifically told the 
defendant not to enter the home. (T. 55-57) A son-in-law might 
well believe he had permission to enter his father-in-law's house 
without being given specific permission. 
Thus, the jury could very well have been convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered the house in 
West Point and stole the items, and at the same time the jury 
could have harbored reasonable doubts about whether the 
defendant's entry into the home was itself unlawful. The 
acquittal on the burglary charge is in no way inconsistent with 
the finding that the defendant committed the theft in Utah. 
The jury was properly instructed as to each element 
necessary to find the defendant guilty of theft, and the jury was 
required to find that the offense occurred in Davis County, Utah 
12 
in order to convict the defendant. (Instructions 4 and 12, R. 
33, 40) Reasonable minds could easily be convinced, from the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
guilty of theft as charged. The jury's verdict should be upheld. 
POINT II. A. 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT OBJECT TO THE GIVING OF 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14, AND CANNOT RAISE THE 
ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The record shows that counsel for the defense read each 
of the jury instructions, and had no objections to any of the 
instructions. (T. 163) Nor were any alternative instructions 
proposed by the defense. 
Having failed to state objections to any instructions at 
the trial level, the defendant cannot now raise an objection to 
instruction 14 for the first time on appeal. Rule 19(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
The giving of Instruction 14 cannot be said to have 
created a "manifest injustice,9* and there is no necessity of 
assigning error on appeal. Unlike the improper jury instruction 
given in State v. Turner. 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
Instruction 14 was couched as a permissive inference, and not as 
a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Instruction 14 not only 
failed to cause a manifest injustice, it caused no injustice at 
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all# as discussed below. The issue simply cannot be raised at 
this late date. 
POINT II. B. 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING POSSESSION OF 
RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY IS A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
SOUND. 
There is no question that due process requires the 
State, in a criminal case, to prove each factual element of a 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed.2d 368 (1970). It is equally 
clear that a jury instruction which creates an irrebuttable 
presumption, or a presumption so strong that only a high level of 
proof can rebut it, causes an unconstitutional shift in the 
burden of proof. Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S. 
Ct. 2450, 2456, 61 L. Ed.2d 39 (1979). And even a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption (i.e., one which instructs the jury that 
they must find a presumed fact if the state has proven particular 
predicate facts) suffers from the same defect, again shifting the 
burden of proof to the defendant. Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 
307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed.2d 344 (1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 
321 (1985) and State v. Pacheco. 712 P.2d 192 (1985), and this 
Court in State v. Turner, supra. have embraced the Francis 
holding and applied it to the mandatory rebuttable presumption 
created by use of the statutory language in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-6-402(1) (1953, as amended) in jury instructions. 
However, the language used in Instruction 14 is couched 
in permissive, not mandatory terms, and avoids the 
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unconstitutional shift of the burden of proof caused by the 
mandatory language struck down in the cases cited above. 
Jury Instruction 14 provided: 
Possession of property recently stolen, if 
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonably 
draw the inference and find, in light of the 
surrounding circumstances shown by the 
evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession stole the property. Thus, if you 
find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant was 
in possession of property, (2) that the 
property was stolen, (3) that such possession 
was not too remote in point of time from the 
theft, and (4) that no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession has been given 
or appears from the evidence, then you may 
infer from those facts and find that the 
defendant stole the property. (R. 42) 
The language, "you may reasonably draw the inference" 
and "you may infer" is clearly permissive. It puts no 
requirements on what findings the jury must make, unlike the 
"shall be deemed prima facie evidence" language of Chambers, 
Pacheco, and Turner above. 
Even in Sandstrom, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court made it clear that permissive inferences are still 
constitutionally proper. In his opinion for the unanimous Court, 
Justice Brennan implied that if the jury had been "told that they 
had a choice or that they might infer that conclusion" 
(Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515, emphasis added), then no reasonable 
juror could have viewed the instruction as mandatory. Justice 
Rehnguist in his concurring opinion added: 
And surely if this charge had, in the words 
of the Court, "merely described a permissive 
inference," ante at 514, it could not 
conceivably run afoul of the constitutional 
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decisions cited by the Court in its opinion. 
Id. at 527. 
In State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that MSandstrom does not apply in this 
case where the jury was instructed that it could infer intent 
from defendants actions. A distinction is made in Sandstrom 
between inferences and presumptions.11 Eagle, 611 P.2d at 1214, 
original emphasis. The instruction in Eagle read as follows: 
A person's state of mind is not always 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be 
inferred from acts, conduct, statements or 
circumstances. 
This Court ruled that this instruction was an accurate statement 
of the law in this state. See State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800 
(Utah 1979); State v. Peterson, 453 P.2d 696 (Utah 1969); 
State v. Whittinghill, 163 P.2d 342 (Utah 1945). 
Furthermore, almost identical language as that in 
Instruction 14 has specifically been held to be proper and not to 
violate any constitutional rights. In Barnes v. U.S., 412 U.S. 
837, 839, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed.2d 380, 384 (1973), the jury 
was instructed that 
possession of recently stolen property, if 
not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a 
circumstance from which you may reasonably 
draw the inference and find, in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances shown by the 
evidence in the case, that the person in 
possession knew the property had been 
stolen. 
The United States Supreme Court first noted that the 
instruction concerns Ha traditional common-law inference deeply 
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rooted in our law,11 and that "courts .... on numerous occasions 
have approved instructions essentially identical to the 
instruction given in this case. This longstanding and consistent 
judicial approval of the instruction, reflecting accumulated 
common experience, provides strong indication that the 
instruction comports with due process.11 412 U.S., at 843-4. The 
court then held that, even in the light of "present day 
experience," the instruction satisfies due process standards. 
The Supreme Court further held that the instruction did 
not infringe on the defendants privilege against self-
incrimination. Id., at 846. See also Turner v. U.S., 396 U.S. 
398, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed.2d 610 (1970); 
Yee Hem v. U.S.. 268 U.S. 178, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L. Ed. 904 
(1925); and Chambers, supra, where the Utah Supreme Court 
rejects the same 5th Amendment argument, citing 88 A.L.R.3d 1178 
(1978) . 
The Utah Supreme Court six months after deciding 
Chambers and Pacheco, in State v. Graves. 717 P.2d 717 (1986), 
quoted the jury instruction given in Barnes (quoted above) with 
approval, stating: 
The Court held, "For centuries courts have 
instructed juries that an inference of guilty 
knowledge may be drawn from the fact of 
unexplained possession of stolen goods." 412 
U.S. at 843, 93 S. Ct. at 2362. 
We have accepted approvingly the inference 
as a factor in proving guilt in such cases as 
State v. Sessions. Utah, 583 P.2d 44 (1978), 
State v. Kirkham. 20 Utah 2d 44, 432 P.2d 638 
(1967), and State v. Merritt. 67 Utah 325, 
247 P. 497 (1926). 
717 P.2d at 718. 
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It is clear that both the United States Supreme Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court do not approve of mandatory 
presumptions (rebuttable or irrebuttable); it is equally clear 
that both courts do constitutionally approve the use of 
permissive presumptions, and both courts specifically approve of 
the language used in Instruction 14. Since Instruction 14 was 
properly couched as a permissive inference, the defendant was not 
denied due process of law. Finally, even if the instruction had 
been given in error, because of the strength of the evidence of 
guilt in addition to the mere possession of the stolen property, 
it would be harmless error. 
Conclusion 
The evidence supports the jury verdict finding the 
defendant guilty of a felony theft committed within the State of 
Utah. Jury Instruction 14 was a proper, constitutionally 
acceptable instruction for the jury, and the defendant is not 
entitled to raise that issue on appeal since he did not object to 
the instruction in the trial court. The defendant is not 
entitled to the relief he seeks on appeal, and his conviction 
should be confirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this P&& day of March, 1988. 
J^/MARK ANDRUS 
Deputy County Attorney 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-201 (1953, as amended) 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an 
offense which he commits, while either within or outside the 
state, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is 
legally accountable, if: 
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within 
the state; or 
(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to 
commit an offense within the state; or 
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy 
to commit an offense within the state and an act in furtherance 
of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or 
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an 
offense under the laws of both this state and such other 
jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either 
the conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result 
which is such an element, occurs within this state. In homicide 
the "result11 is either the physical contact which causes death, or 
the death itself; and if the body of a homicide victim is found 
within the state, the death shall be presumed to have occurred 
within the state. 
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty 
imposed by the law of this state is committed within the state 
regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the 
omission. 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-202 (1953, as amended) 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-402(1)(1953, as amended) 
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part: 
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no 
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be 
deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole 
the property. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404 (1953, as amended) 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-19(9-c) (1953, as 
amended) 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written request that 
the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the 
request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be 
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furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or 
otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or 
refused, the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial 
or sign it. If part be given and part refused, the court shall 
distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the charge 
was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or 
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the ground of his objection. Norwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order 
to avoid a manifest injustice. 
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